

Examiner Safety Manual

for

Single pilot type aircraft

Multi-engine turbine

Types of aircraft covered:

Aérospatiale	S760
Beechcraft Raytheon	RA390
Cessna	C501/551
	C510
	C525
Embraer	EMB500
	EMB505
Eclipse Aerospace	EA500

MER type aircraft

Contents

1	General	3
	1.1 Examiner safety manual (ESM)	3
	1.2 Simulated failures	4
2	Feedback system	5
3.	Procedure template	6
	3.1 FCL reference and title	6
	3.2 Minima	6
	3.3 Failure simulation	
	3.4 Stopping the procedure in a normal situation.	6
	3.5 Safety instructions.	
	3.6 Threat and Error Management (T.E.M.)	
4	••••••	
	4.1 General test conditions	7
	4.2 Meteorological minima	
	4.3 Situations not authorised during the test	8
5		
	5.1 Engine start-up: Malfunctions	
	5.2 Takeoff interrupted at a reasonable speed.	
	5.3 Simulated artificial horizon and compass failure	11
	5.4 Very low speed flight	
	5.5 Stalls - Approaches to stalls	
	5.6 Approaches to VMCA	14
	5.7 Recovering from unusual situations	
	5.8 In-flight engine failure and relight	
	5.9 Clean landing	
	5.10 Landing gear extension/retraction failure	
	5.11 Emergency descent	
	5.12 Engine fire during takeoff	
	5.13 Engine failure during takeoff	21
	5.14 Asymmetric approach	
	5.15 Asymmetric go-around	
	5.16 Asymmetric approach at MVL	
	5.17 Asymmetric landing	25



Examiner safety manual (ESM)

MER type aircraft

<u>1 General</u>

1.1 Examiner safety manual (ESM)

Appendix 1 to FCL 1.240 (5) provides that: "The Authority will provide the examiner with safety criteria to be observed in the conduct of the test/check.".

The safety instructions described in this manual must be applied by examiners for all tests on MULTI-ENGINE TURBINE aeroplanes, with the exception of tests carried out within an ATO with a safety manual approved for the type of aeroplane in question.

This manual is published by: DGAC - DSAC/PN - Pôle Examens - 50, rue Henry Farman - 75720 PARIS CEDEX 15.


This manual replaces the "Flight Examiner and Instructor manual" for the corresponding type/variant of aeroplane.

This manual does not replace the flight manual or operating manual, as applicable.

This manual is available online at: http://www.developpement-durable.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/MS_MER_cle49e358.pdf

This manual may not be amended or published without the approval of the DGAC.

Updates to this manual can be published at any time, without notice. The examiner is responsible for checking the validity of the version used prior to any in-flight test.



1.2 Simulated failures.

Simulated failures can be classified into two categories: major failures and minor failures.

Major failures consist of those with a direct influence on the flight path or safety and which last for a given period, such as engine malfunctions, landing gear failure and the failure of systems or circuits which are considered essential for flight.

Other failures such as the loss of a generator or a non-essential or backed-up circuit can be considered as minor.

The list of minor or major failures will vary for each aircraft, depending on manufacturer requirements, and even operator requirements.

The failure simulation must be adapted to your experience, the situation on the day and the crew in all cases.

It is also important to remember that a failure simulation is a means of checking the skills and not the limits of the student.

Combining two major failures is **not permitted.**

A major failure should only be combined with another failure or two minor failures if the situation is realistic and has training benefits.

Failures can only be initialised using the method adopted in this manual, excluding all other methods.

Failure simulations will be stopped if the conditions of execution are not optimal.


If safety could be compromised by continuing with a failure simulation, the safety pilot will immediately take the controls and the following announcements will be required:

"I HAVE CONTROL" by the safety pilot

or

"RIGHT CONTROL – PROCEDURE OVER" by the examiner if in the back seat

If a real failure occurs when a simulation is planned or in progress, the above announcements will be made by the safety pilot or the examiner and the procedure will be immediately interrupted.



2 Feedback system

Permanent feedback is required for operations and distribution due to the safety-related nature of this manual. Any problem encountered during a simulated failure or procedure affecting the safety of the aircraft or the crew must be analysed.

The feedback form enclosed will be filled out by the examiner and distributed to the coordinator for single pilot aircraft examiners who, after analysis, may distribute the information and/or update specific instructions in this manual.

This form is also used to submit comments or suggestions in relation to this manual.

MER aeroplane ESM feedback form		
Sheet No.		
Aircraft type		
TRE number		
Brief description of the situation		
Problems or safety-related issues		
Solutions proposed and amendments		
Feedback sheet to be transmitted to: The Coordinator for professional examiners for single-pilot aeroplanes DGAC DSAC/PN. 50, rue Henry Farman 75720 PARIS Cedex 15 Tel.: 01.58.09.35.23/43.43 E-mail: eric.tournier@aviation-civile.gouv.fr stephane.kovacic@aviation-civile.gouv.fr		



Examiner safety manual (ESM)

MER type aircraft

3. Procedure template.

3.1 FCL reference and title

FCL section and title for the procedure.

Precise procedure required to check the skills of the pilot for the type or class and FCL references (appendix 2 to FCL 1.170, appendix 2 to FCL 1.210, appendix 3 to FCL 1.240, appendix 2 to FCL 1.330 & 1.345).

This sheet can validate the item in the defined section. Several sheets validate the same section. The examiner will select the appropriate sheet in coordination with the safety pilot depending on external risks.

3.2 Minima

The meteorological or technical minima required to execute the corresponding section.

3.3 Failure simulation

Advice for the procedure. This section provides the examiner with instructions on the conditions and execution method for the simulated failure by the safety pilot.

If no specific instruction is given in this section, the corresponding failure must be triggered in accordance with good instructor practices for the single-pilot aeroplane type or class qualification.

3.4 Stopping the procedure in a normal situation.

The return to nominal conditions is a sensitive part of the test which must be studied as it increases crew workload. This point is essential to avoid any confusion or misunderstandings between the applicant and the safety pilot.

3.5 Safety instructions.


It is appropriate to create a framework for the execution of the manoeuvres for the aeroplane and the crew. This framework must be adapted to your experience and external risks. This framework is intended to ensure the safety of the aircraft and the crew and may not be exceeded.

On the other hand, the framework may be restricted depending on internal or external risks.

3.6 Threat and Error Management (T.E.M.)

According to experience, an unsuitable or sudden manoeuvre by an applicant can lead to a critical situation.

This section lists the most frequent dangers and errors recorded during tests.



4 General rules

These rules apply to all sections of an in-flight test on a multi-engine turbine type aeroplane. These rules do not replace the flight manual

The safety instructions specific to each section are complementary to these rules and described in the following section.

Before starting the test, the examiner must ensure that the safety instructions described in this section and the next section can be complied with, for all of the procedures and manoeuvres planned for the test.

- 4.1 General test conditions
 - Specific flight, without passengers: The test may not be combined with another flight, such as a maintenance or training flight.
 - Unless specific circumstances apply, the examiner must be seated on a jump-seat or in the cabin in immediate view of the cockpit with a means of communicating with the crew. The specific circumstances justifying an exception to this clause (specific aeroplane layout, no adequate seat, two-seater aeroplane, etc.) must be accepted by the DSAC/PN.
 - Safety briefing:

An additional safety briefing will be organised before the test by the examiner. All of the in-flight items required for the test will be positioned in their context according to the safety manual. The safety pilot will be fully involved in this respect.

- Technical condition of the aeroplane checked; for MEL departures, the examiner will decide if the test is possible or not. The test will be immediately interrupted if a real failure occurs during execution.
- The test will be carried out in controlled airspace as far as possible.
- Failure simulation is a means of checking the skills and under no circumstances the limits of the student. The simulations must be adapted to your experience, the situation on the day and the crew in all cases.

4.2 <u>Meteorological minima</u>

at the airfield(s) used for runway circuit handling manoeuvres:

- Minimum visibility: 5000 m
- Minimum ceiling: 2000 ft
- Non-contaminated runway

for the entire flight:

• No icing conditions during single-engine flight manoeuvres (including simulations)

4.3 <u>Situations not authorised during the test</u>

- Flight with shutdown turbine (gas generator) not permitted below 5000 ft AGL
- Flight at a speed less than 1.30xVs not permitted below 5000 ft AGL (Vs = stall speed in the configuration used)
- Engine failure or single-engine flight, including when simulated, not permitted with the flaps at maximum angle
- Flight with a breaker open for flight purposes not permitted below 1500 ft AAL. This prohibition will not apply in the event of a real failure occurring during the test.

<u>Important</u>: The Above Ground Level (AGL) values must take into consideration the altitude of obstacles or terrain within a radius of 5 NM on either side of the flight path.

The Above Airfield Level (AAL) values are based on the altitude of the airfield used.



Examiner safety manual (ESM)

5 The Procedures.

5.1 Engine start-up: Malfunctions

1 - FCL references	Regulation No. 1178/2011
2 - Minima	-
3 – Situation simulated by the examiner	Announce a significant increase in temperature, a fire for the engine in question or any procedure from the flight manual leading to a shutdown at start-up (no ignition, abnormal increase in ITT or EGT, etc).
4 - Stop the procedure	After handling the malfunction and before restarting the engine.
5 - SAFETY INSTRUCTIONS	 Always inform ground staff before boarding the aeroplane, a misunderstanding of the situation could lead to dangerous reactions. E.g.: Involve safety staff on the ground by asking them to make a conventional engine shut down sign at start-up. Visual scanning must be maintained outside the aircraft until the engines come to a complete shutdown. Do not forget to take the limitations of the starter and/or battery into consideration. Pay close attention to the actions of the pilot and be ready to block these actions Reconfigure the aircraft before restarting (with engine ventilation if necessary).
6 - ERRORS AND CRITICAL SITUATIONS	Rushed execution of procedures and inappropriate actions. E.g.: engine error, fuel line opened, fire extinguisher struck, etc.



5.2 Takeoff interrupted at a reasonable speed.


1 - FCL references	Regulation No. 1178/2011
2 - Minima	Min. runway width: 30 m Min. runway length = 1.5 ASD* calculated for the conditions on the day * ASD = Accelerate-Stop Distance published in the flight manual
3 - Simulation of the failure or procedure - Situation simulated	Allow the aeroplane to accelerate to a maximum speed of 60 kt then: The safety pilot: - clearly announces the activation of an alarm or an explicit failure (e.g. "CABIN DOOR indicator on", "ENG FIRE indicator on", "Inconsistent anemometer", etc.), or - activates illuminated alarm indicators (e.g. ENG FIRE alarm test).
4 - Stop the procedure	Wait for the conclusions reached on the decisions made Announce "end-of-procedure". Wait long enough to allow the brakes to cool (carry out this procedure at the end of the flight if possible).
5 - SAFETY INSTRUCTIONS	Notify ATC before the procedure Check that the student has not blocked wrists or knees. Wait long enough to allow the brakes to cool Start the procedure at the earliest possible point to avoid the aeroplane storing energy, which must subsequently be dissipated.
6 - ERRORS AND CRITICAL SITUATIONS	Late reaction, no throttle reduction, sudden braking, reduced throttle for one engine only.



MER type aircraft


5.3 Simulated artificial horizon and compass failure

1 - FCL references	Regulation No. 1178/2011
2 - Minima	Meteorological conditions compatible with flight based on external cues from the seat of the safety pilot, No risk of reduced availability for the safety pilot.
3 - Simulation of the failure or procedure - Situation simulated	Using a suitable cover for each instrument or by disabling the sources (disconnect the sources, dim the screens) of the following information: - main artificial horizon and main heading indicator, or - EADI and EHSI for aeroplanes equipped with electronic instruments, or - the PFD for aircraft equipped with integrated electronic avionics or the AHRS failure for Garmin 1000 type avionics
4 - Stop the procedure	In level flight with zero bank angle, remove the covers or re-establish the display and sources of the corresponding instruments.
5 - SAFETY INSTRUCTIONS	Check that no flag has appeared for back-up instruments
6 - ERRORS AND CRITICAL SITUATIONS	Incorrect visual scanning, Sensory illusions, reverse bank correction, disorientation*, initial spiralling in descent (particularly during the partial panel). * If the student is disorientated, stop the procedure, remove the covers, the safety pilot will take the controls, return the aeroplane to straight and level flight. Wait long enough for the pilot to adapt before restarting the manoeuvres.




5.4 Very low speed flight

1 - FCL references	Regulation No. 1178/2011
2 - Minima	Meteorological conditions compatible with flight based on external cues from the seat of the safety pilot, No severe or moderate turbulence, No risk of reduced availability for the safety pilot.
3 - Simulation of the failure or procedure - Situation simulated	Specify the required speed with reference to Vs. The pilot should reduce power. The power will not be reduced to IDLE, but minimal power will be maintained (in accordance with the flight manual).
4 - Stop the procedure	Acceleration managed by the pilot, at Vi > 1.45 x Vs , announce "end-of-procedure", Check configuration at the end of manoeuvres: landing gear and flaps
5 - SAFETY INSTRUCTIONS	min. 5000 ft AGL, IGNITION ON or AUTO (see flight manual), maintain the minimum engine power described in §3,(?) check that each zone is maintained before each manoeuvre, check configuration at the end of manoeuvres: landing gear and flaps
6 - ERRORS AND CRITICAL SITUATIONS	Sudden control input, Poor precision, Excessive bank, Acceleration configuration or engine limits exceeded.




5.5 Stalls - Approaches to stalls

1 - FCL references	Regulation No. 1178/2011
2 - Minima	Meteorological conditions compatible with flight based on external cues from the seat of the safety pilot, No risk of reduced availability for the safety pilot.
3 - Simulation of the failure or procedure - Situation simulated	The pilot should reduce power. The power will not be reduced to IDLE, but minimal power will be maintained (in accordance with the flight manual). <u>Stalls:</u> on aeroplanes with stick-pushers, the manoeuvre will be interrupted when the stick-pusher activates at the latest. <u>Approaching stalls</u> : The recovery procedure will be started when the first signs of a stall are detected (stall alarm, buffeting, stick-shaker, etc.)
4 - Stop the procedure	Announce "end-of-procedure" Acceleration managed by the pilot
5 - SAFETY INSTRUCTIONS	min. 5000 ft AGL, maintain the minimum engine power described in §3 check that each zone is maintained before each manoeuvre, Check configuration at the end of manoeuvres: landing gear and flaps
- ERRORS AND CRITICAL SITUATIONS	Priority not given to reducing angle of attack Throttle movement too fast at the end of the procedure with a desire to maintain altitude at any cost. Engine control varies, the aircraft could stall asymmetrically*. * the safety pilot will take the controls and fly a suitable recovery in this case.




5.6 Approaches to VMCA

1 - FCL references	Regulation No. 1178/2011
2 - Minima	Meteorological conditions compatible with flight based on external cues from the seat of the safety pilot, No risk of reduced availability for the safety pilot.
3 - Simulation of the failure or procedure - Situation simulated	Ball in the centre No aircraft in the vicinity Flap position 1 (Approach or Take-Off) Power reduced for one engine with full power allowed on the operative engine (within limits). Angle of attack 2° more than the nominal N-1 angle of attack Ensure the student maintains constant heading to maximum yaw input Examples of situations to be simulated: N-1 go-around, failure at takeoff or at go-around with poor control of angle of attack, inadequate energy levels on N-1 final approach, non- consideration of drag in N-1 flight (landing gear not retracted, etc.)
4 - Stop the procedure	Speed in excess of 1.45 Vs and aeroplane in level flight: announce "end-of- procedure" Acceleration managed by the pilot
5 - SAFETY INSTRUCTIONS	min. 5000 ft AGL, check that each zone is maintained before each manoeuvre, Check configuration at the end of manoeuvres: landing gear and flaps Allow loss of altitude Stop trim use at 1.45 Vs Priority must be accorded to reducing power for the operative engine. The procedure will be immediately interrupted at the first signs of a stall.
6 - ERRORS AND CRITICAL SITUATIONS	Full power not used for the operative engine, leading to a risk of stall before Vmca, Sudden bank action before reducing power for the operative engine, Parameters exceeded for the operative engine. Students must reduce power to recover control of the aeroplane.




5.7 Recovering from unusual situations

1 - FCL references	Regulation No. 1178/2011
2 - Minima	Meteorological conditions compatible with flight based on external cues from the seat of the safety pilot, No risk of reduced availability for the safety pilot.
3 - Simulation of the failure or procedure - Situation simulated	Plan for at least 2000 ft in altitude variation for the manoeuvres. <u>Example of a dive situation</u> : Establish clean holding speed 1.45Vs, bank 45° and release the stick. Apply the recovery method The recovery can be flown using the back-up horizon for greater realism (This critical situation can be caused by ADI failure) <u>Nose-up recovery</u> : Pull on the stick and bank the aeroplane to a maximum angle of 45°. Apply the recovery method.
4 - Stop the procedure	Stable parameters Aeroplane in level flight
5 - SAFETY INSTRUCTIONS	min. 5000 ft AGL for the entire procedure. Plan for a large enough area for manoeuvres, particularly in terms of the altitude variation cleared by ATC (if clearance is required). Speed at the start of the procedure compatible with acceleration without exceeding limits, particularly limit speeds.
6 - ERRORS AND CRITICAL SITUATIONS	Confusion between a descending turn and a dive, wings not brought to horizontal Sudden action potentially causing the maximum load factor to be exceeded. Incorrect initial configuration (flat, landing gear) End of procedure with inappropriate throttle adjustment.




5.8 In-flight engine failure and relight

1 - FCL references	Regulation No. 1178/2011
2 - Minima	Meteorological conditions compatible with flight based on external cues from the seat of the safety pilot, No risk of reduced availability for the safety pilot.
3 - Simulation of the failure or procedure - Situation simulated	Complete execution of an engine failure or shutdown procedure. Example of a simulated voluntary engine shutdown: The examiner verbally announces a situation requiring the engine to be shut down (strong vibrations, engine failure) or activates a complete engine failure. After the pilot has handled the procedure, the examiner announces "End-of- procedure" and requests an in-flight relight.
4 - Stop the procedure	Engine restart using reference documentation
5 - SAFETY INSTRUCTIONS	min. 5000 ft AGL Min. speed: 1.45 Vs. In the immediate vicinity of an accessible airfield in single engine configuration.
6 - ERRORS AND CRITICAL SITUATIONS	Incomplete execution of the procedure before relighting, which could lead to an inadequate aircraft configuration.




5.9 Clean landing

1 - FCL references	Regulation No. 1178/2011
2 - Minima	LDA (*) > 1.5 x LD flaps 0° (**) *: LDA = Landing Distance Available **: LD = Clean Landing Distance according to the flight manual for the conditions on the day
3 - Simulation of the failure or procedure - Situation simulated	When the pilot extends the flaps, verbally announce or indicate with a gesture that the flap system or controls have blocked. Example: The examiner announces "The flaps will not extend" and the safety pilot will block the flap control.
4 - Stop the procedure	The examiner announces "end of flap failure"
5 - SAFETY INSTRUCTIONS	Prefer a Stop and go or a full stop landing (no touch and go). No change of configuration on final approach. If a breaker is deactivated by the pilot during the check list phase, the breakers must be reconfigured by the safety pilot before descending below 1500 ft AAL.
6 - ERRORS AND CRITICAL SITUATIONS	Poor approach angle judgement and improper speed on final approach, Inadequate attitude, Inappropriate reduction in power based on the absence of drag, Ground control.




5.10 Landing gear extension/retraction failure

1 - FCL references	Regulation No. 1178/2011
2 - Minima	-
3 - Simulation of the failure or procedure - Situation simulated	Just before the pilot extends/retracts the landing gear, verbally announce or indicate with a gesture that the landing gear system or controls have blocked. Example: The examiner announces "The landing gear will not extend/retract" and the safety pilot will block the landing gear control.
4 - Stop the procedure	Clearly announce the end of the landing gear failure. The safety pilot announces "recycling" to the PF and reconfigures the aircraft, including the re-activation of the landing gear breaker. The procedure ends when the aircraft comes to a complete standstill after landing.
5 - SAFETY INSTRUCTIONS	The breakers must be reconfigured by the safety pilot before descending below 1500 ft AAL.
6 - ERRORS AND CRITICAL SITUATIONS	 Min. speed not maintained Sudden and/or imprecise flight control Automatic pilot not used Poor time management, leading to a non-stable approach: do not allow the student to start the final approach without having fully managed the failure Landing gear extended/retracted by the pilot before the examiner has time to announce the failure. In this case, the examiner allows the landing gear to extend/retract in full to avoid forcing systems.




5.11 Emergency descent

1 - FCL references	Regulation No. 1178/2011
2 - Minima	Descent minimum FL > safety altitude (*) + 2000 ft *: Safety altitude = Safety altitude in the area used for the manoeuvres (MSA, grid MORA, etc.)
3 - Simulation of the failure or procedure - Situation simulated	Define the initial level Define the minimum level Verbally simulate explosive decompression with an uncontrollable positive cabin climb rate or the appearance of smoke in the cabin. Actual use of O ₂ PEQ masks and simulated dropping of passenger O ₂ masks
4 - Stop the procedure	Stable altitude, throttle applied, automatic pilot engaged, masks removed and conclusions reached on the decisions made. Announce "end-of-procedure".
5 - SAFETY INSTRUCTIONS	Except in icy conditions It is essential to coordinate with ATC before the procedure to define the minimum level for the manoeuvre as a target level The minimum level will be above or equal to the safety altitude +2000 ft
6 - ERRORS AND CRITICAL SITUATIONS	Poor use of the automatic pilot, leading to voluntary disconnection, Extension of drag-inducing devices outside of limits, Poor forward planning when approaching VMO/MMO, Switch to level light inadequately prepared, Power not readjusted in level flight, No conclusions reached on the decisions made.



5.12 Engine fire during takeoff


1 - FCL references	Regulation No. 1178/2011
2 - Minima	Meteorological conditions compatible with flight based on external cues from the seat of the safety pilot, No risk of reduced availability for the safety pilot.
3 - Simulation of the failure or procedure - Situation simulated	Announce an engine fire verbally after unstick. E.g.: "LEFT ENGINE FIRE indicator on! "
4 - Stop the procedure	Wait for the conclusions reached on the decisions made Announce "end-of-procedure". Wait to achieve complete stable symmetrical flight with N engines before starting any other procedure (or returning to the ground)
5 - SAFETY INSTRUCTIONS	Consider the environment (ATC, air traffic) to ensure that a choice must be made and a decision reached, and notify ATC before the procedure if necessary due to a changed flight path, The safety pilot must block the throttle to avoid any action on the engines below 400 ft AAL, Systematically check drag-inducing devices (landing gear and flaps).
6 - ERRORS AND CRITICAL SITUATIONS	Procedure initially launched too hastily and below 400 ft AAL, Confusion with engine failure at takeoff, No explicit change in plan of action leading to a change in flight path with no coordination with ATC.



5.13 Engine failure during takeoff


This sheet applies for failure at both takeoff and a go-around.

1 - FCL references	Regulation No. 1178/2011
2 - Minima	Meteorological conditions compatible with flight based on external cues from the seat of the safety pilot, No risk of reduced availability for the safety pilot.
3 - Simulation of the failure or procedure - Situation simulated	 1 – the examiner announces "Engine failure" 2 – The safety pilot smoothly reduces the power of one engine using the throttle
4 - Stop the procedure	Wait for the conclusions reached on the decisions made Announce "end-of-procedure". Set or instruct the student to set the appropriate power for the engines to reduce the asymmetry Wait to achieve complete stable symmetrical flight with N engines before starting any other procedure or returning to the ground
5 - SAFETY INSTRUCTIONS	Conditions to activate the failure: – Minimum height 400 Ft AAL – Landing gear up – Flap configuration for single-engine climb – Speed in excess of the single engine climb speed
6 - ERRORS AND CRITICAL SITUATIONS	Improper attitude. Sudden action leading to excessive parameters for the operative engine. Sudden reverse yaw input. Excessive or inadequate yaw input in the correct direction. Poor flight path control. Note: It may be necessary to reduce power for the operative engine if bank control is lost.



5.14 Asymmetric approach

1 - FCL references	Regulation No. 1178/2011
2 - Minima	-
3 - Simulation of the failure or procedure - Situation simulated	Before the approach phase, reduce one of the engines to idle or organise an engine failure at takeoff or go-around after a previous approach.
4 - Stop the procedure	Announce "end-of-procedure". Set or instruct the student to set the appropriate torques for the engines to reduce the asymmetry Wait to achieve complete stable symmetrical flight with N engines before starting any other procedure or returning to the ground
5 - SAFETY INSTRUCTIONS	No unrealistic ATC restrictions for the procedure Check that the RUDDER BIAS or RUDDER BOOST system (if fitted) is engaged and has been tested.
6 - ERRORS AND CRITICAL SITUATIONS	Use of full power for the remaining engine, despite existing excessive speed, Late application of throttle with low speed, Limits exceeded for the operative engine.




5.15 Asymmetric go-around

1 - FCL references	Regulation No. 1178/2011
2 - Minima	-
3 - Simulation of the failure or procedure - Situation simulated	The aeroplane must be configured for final approach, simulated single engine, with flaps at the Approach setting , subsequent to a simulated failure, fire or engine shutdown.
4 - Stop the procedure	Clean aeroplane, controlled flight path, next segment and limit announced.
5 - SAFETY INSTRUCTIONS	Minimum height for the manoeuvre: DA, MDA or DH (as applicable).
6 - ERRORS AND CRITICAL SITUATIONS	Improper attitude, Sudden action leading to limits being exceeded for the operative engine. Sudden yaw input. Poor or no flight path control

5.16 Asymmetric approach at MVL

1 - FCL references	Regulation No. 1178/2011
2 - Minima	Visibility > MVL with no risk of losing sight of the runway during the manoeuvre, Ceiling > 1000 ft AAL or MDH for the MVL if higher
3 - Simulation of the failure or procedure - Situation simulated	Aeroplane with simulated N-1 engines in MVL configuration Check that speed is equal to or more than 1.45 Vs for the configuration. Check the Approach flaps.
4 - Stop the procedure	Announce "end-of-procedure". Set or instruct the student to set the appropriate N1 for the engines to reduce the asymmetry Wait to achieve complete stable symmetrical flight with N engines before starting any other procedure or on the ground after landing
5 - SAFETY INSTRUCTIONS	Prior coordination with ATC is indispensable, indicate the selected height to stop the procedure.
6 - ERRORS AND CRITICAL SITUATIONS	Improper attitude, Sudden action leading to limits being exceeded for the operative engine. Sudden yaw input. Poor or no flight path control



5.17 Asymmetric landing

1 - FCL references	Regulation No. 1178/2011
2 - Minima	LDA (*) > 1.5 x LD flaps 0° (**) *: LDA = Landing Distance Available **: LD = Clean Landing Distance according to the flight manual for the conditions on the day
3 - Simulation of the failure or procedure - Situation simulated	After a previous engine failure, the final approach is flown with one engine at idle.
4 - Stop the procedure	When the aeroplane comes to a complete standstill on the runway.
5 - SAFETY INSTRUCTIONS	Check yaw damper disconnected, Runway with length > 1.5 LD Flaps 0°, Full flaps must not be used .
6 - ERRORS AND CRITICAL SITUATIONS	Sudden reduction in power, leading to asymmetry during the flare, Recommendations on the use of reverse thrust for the operative engine not applied